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I. INTRODUCTION
The Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act (the Act) was created in
order to provide employment opportunities for the blind.1 The Act
established a cooperative federal-state program aimed at granting priority to
blind persons who wished to operate vending facilities on federal property.
2
At the federal level, the Department of Education oversees the
administration of the Act.3 Designated state licensing agencies implement
the program at the state level. 4 To become designated, a state licensing
agency must first apply to the Secretary of Education and agree to follow
requirements set forth by federal law.5 When a potential blind vendor
wishes to become licensed, he must then apply to the state agency. 6 The
state agency in turn applies to a federal agency for the placement of the
licensee on federal property. 7 Once a vending location is determined, the
state licensing agency then becomes responsible for equipping the facility. 8
In the event of a complaint or a dispute on the part of the licensee, he
may request that an arbitration panel resolve his grievance. 9 As a result of
* 119 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 1997).
1 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 107-107f (1990). The Act was enacted:
For the purposes of providing blind persons with remunerative employment,
enlarging the economic opportunities of the blind, and stimulating the blind to
greater efforts in striving to make themselves self-supporting, blind persons
licensed... shall be authorized to operate vending facilities on any Federal
property.
Id. § 107(a).
2 See id. § 107(b).
3 See id. § 107a.
4 See id. § 107a(a)(5).
5 See id. § 107b. "State participation in the program is voluntary, and a[n]
[interested] state agency... must apply to the Secretary of Education and agree to a
number of conditions." Premo, 119 F.3d at 767.
6 See Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of America v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 93,
102 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also 20 U.S.C. § 107a(a)(5).
7 See 20 U.S.C. § 107a(a)(5), (c).
8 See id. § 107b(2).
9 See id. § 107b(6). One of the conditions a state agency agrees to in its application
to the Secretary of Education is:
[To provide to any blind licensee dissatisfied with any action arising from the
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the ability of arbitration panels to award relief, two issues have arisen in the
interpretation of the Act: (1) whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
the awarding of compensatory relief by Randolph-Sheppard arbitration
panels; and (2) whether an arbitration award under the Act violates due
process. 10 Only four circuits have addressed these issues, with varying
results. Although there has been a split in the circuits, the Supreme Court
has yet to address the aforementioned issues.
This Note will first examine the facts and procedural history of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Premo. Next, it will address the three other
circuit court decisions that have dealt with similar issues and their different
approaches to the same problem. Lastly, the Note will support the Prenw
decision as a correct decision, in that compensatory awards are not
prevented by the Eleventh Amendment, based on statutory interpretation
and policy matters.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Premo, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed these issues in
the context of a licensee, Jeana Martin, invoking her right to arbitration
after her license was revoked. Martin had been issued a license in 1985 by
the California Department of Rehabilitation so that she could operate a
snack bar and lunch room at a United States Post Office. 11 After several
years of financial difficulties and relocations, the State revoked her
license. 12 Martin had requested two state hearings during her time of
financial difficulty and was denied relief by the State both times. 13
operation or administration of the vending facility program an opportunity for a
fair hearing, and to agree to submit the grievances of any blind licensee not
otherwise resolved by such hearing to arbitration ....
Premo, 119 F.3d at 767.
10 See Premo, 119 F.3d at 766. The issue of due process is a secondary issue to
the Eleventh Amendment issue. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
11 See id. at 767. Brenda Premo was the Director of the California Department of
Rehabilitation, who appealed the circuit court's granting of summary judgment to
Martin. See infra text accompanying notes 22-28.
12 See Premo, 119 F.3d at 767. Martin's license was revoked by the State of
California in 1992. See id.
13 See id. "In 1990, she [Martin] filed a complaint alleging that the State had
violated the Act by failing to take adequate steps to ensure compliance by the Postal
Service. In 1992, she challenged the State's termination of her vendor's license." Id.
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Subsequent to the state hearings, Martin invoked her right to arbitration
pursuant to the Act.14
Once Martin invoked her right to arbitration by panel, the arbitrators
were selected in accordance with the Act. 15 Each party selected one panel
member, and the two members chosen by Martin and the State in turn
selected the third member. 16 The panel reached its decision in August 1994,
ruling that the State had improperly revoked Martin's license. 17 The panel
ruled that "lapses" by the State had caused Martin's financial difficulties. 18
Among the State's lapses cited by the panel were: (1) the failure to renovate
the Postal Office facilities; (2) the failure to assign income from competing
machines to Martin; and (3) the failure to prevent the Postal Office from
awarding the contract to another vendor.19 As a result, Martin was awarded
$379,025.05 in lost income and $70,898.65 in attorney's fees and costs.20
Additionally, the panel "ordered the State to reinstate Martin's license,
restore her to a comparable vending facility and to pay her at a rate of
$5,731.94 per month" until restoration was complete. 21
Following the arbitration panel's decision, the State proceeded to file an
action in federal court.22 The state alleged that an award of compensatory
damages under the Act violates its Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity from such awards. 23 In an alternative claim, the State alleged that
14 See id.
15 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 107d-1, d-2. If a blind vendor is displeased with the results
of a state hearing, the vendor "may ask the Secretary to convene an arbitration panel to
resolve the dispute." Tennessee Dep't. of Human Services. v. United States Dep't. of
Educ., 979 F.2d 1162, 1164 (6th Cir. 1992).
16 See Premo, 119 F.3d at 767.
17 See id. The State's attorney had requested a continuance during the arbitration,
objected to Martin's panel member selection and objected to testimony introduced by
Martin's former attorney. The State's objections and requests were all denied. See id.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21Id.
22 The State identified the following defendants in its claim: the Secretary of
Education, the United States Department of Education and Martin. See id.
23 See id. The Eleventh Amendment states that: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. For more information
regarding the Eleventh Amendment and its role in jurisprudence, see JoHN E. NowAK
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the panel's denials of the state's requests and objections during the
arbitration constituted a violation of due process. 24 Martin counterclaimed
and both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 25
The district court, in granting Martin's motion for summary judgment,
held that sovereign immunity had been waived by the State. Additionally,
the district court found that because the state is not a person under the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment, there was no violation of due process. 26
The State appealed the district court decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.27 The court reviewed the Eleventh
Amendment immunity issue de novo, and reviewed the arbitral award under
the Act as an agency action, governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act. 28 Upon review, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court.
2 9
III. DISCUSSION
In affirming the district court decision, the Ninth Circuit held that: (1)
"Mhe Eleventh Amendment does not apply to Randolph-Sheppard
arbitration proceedings and thus does not limit the authority of arbitration
panels convened under the Act to award compensatory relief" ;3o (2) "states
have waived their sovereign immunity to enforcement of such awards in
federal court";31 and (3) the arbitration proceedings complied with the
provisions of the APA. 32
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA FT. AL, CONSTUTIONAL LAW 44-54 (1991).
24 See Premo, 119 F.3d at 767; see also supra note 10.
25 See Premo, 119 F.3d. at 767-768.
26 See id. The court also held that the award granted by the arbitration was neither
"arbitrary" nor "capricious." See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1996). "Under the APA, agency action may be set
aside only if 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.'" Premo, 119 F.3d at 768 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); In re
Transcon Lines, 89 F.3d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 1996)).
2 9 See Premo, 119 F.3d. at 772.
30 Id. at 769.
31 Id. at 771.
3 2 See id. at 772.
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First, the court held that the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to
arbitration proceedings. 33 Conceptually, the State is protected because the
Amendment bars both suits in federal courts by other states and suits by the
State's own citizens.34 Additionally, the court determined that nothing in
the plain meaning of the text represented that the Amendment applies to
arbitration awards. 35 However, the court found that the State had
relinquished its Eleventh Amendment protection through waiving its
sovereign immunity when it agreed to partake in the terms and conditions
of the Act.36 In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed three separate
circuit court decisions which have considered the question of whether the
Eleventh Amendment applies to the Act. 37
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Tennessee Department of
Natural Resources v. United States Department of Education,38 held that
the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent an award of damages by an
arbitration panel.39 However, in coming to this conclusion, the Sixth
Circuit found that the State had waived its immunity to such suits, holding
that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit an arbitrator's award of
retroactive damages against a state.40 Waiver of a state's immunity occurs
33 See id. at 769.
34 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890). Suit may also be barred even
though the state is not a named party. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663
(1974).
35 See Premo, 119 F.3d at 769.
36 See id. "There are two well-recognized exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment
protection from suits for damages. Congress can abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity without the consent of the state in certain instances, or
a state can waive its immunity by consenting to suit in federal court." Id. at 768 (citing
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985)).
37 See Tennessee Dep't of Human Services v. United States Dep't of Educ., 979
F.2d 1162, 1165-1168 (6th Cir. 1992); McNabb v. United States Dep't of Educ., 862
F.2d 81, 683-684 (8th Cir. 1988); Delaware Dep't of Health & Soc. Services v. United
States Dep't of Educ., 772 F.2d 1123, 1137-1138 (3d Cir. 1985).
38 979 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1992).
39 See id. at 1167. The court based its decision on the fact that at the time
Congress passed the Act, they "surely [were] aware that arbitration panels routinely
awarded retroactive relief." Id. at 1165. The court noted, however, that "while the
amendment may not prevent the arbitration panel from making the award, it will
prevent a subsequent attempt to collect the award through the federal courts." Id. at
1167.
40 See id. at 1168.
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when a state "opts to participate in a federal program in which Congress
clearly has conditioned participation on such a waiver." 41 It should be
noted that the Sixth Circuit did not find the plain meaning of the Act to be a
persuasive factor in its decision. 42
Interestingly enough, the court found its greatest difficulty in
determining whether damages could be awarded, finding "no mention [in
the Act] of retroactive liability or of states' liability for, or immunity from,
damages." 43 As a result, the court held that the Eleventh Amendment does
not prohibit the awarding of retroactive damages by "an Article I body." 44
However, the court distinguished between federal and private enforcement,
holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars private enforcement by a federal
court. 45
The Tennessee court seemed to have reached a somewhat inconsistent
holding. The Sixth Circuit held that the Act allows the awarding of relief,
but does not allow blind vendors to enforce the awards in federal court. If
the federal statute allows for the awarding of relief, then it follows that such
awards should be enforceable in federal court.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a different result in
considering the Eleventh Amendment issue in McNabb v. United States
Department of Education.46 A divided panel determined that an award of
compensatory damages would not be enforced, finding no authority under
the Act for awarding retroactive damages. 47 However, the panel did find
41 Id. at 1166.
42 See id. at 1168. "The text of the Randolph-Sheppard Act reflects neither an
unmistakable intention by Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity nor a
clear statement that participation in the program will constitute a waiver of immunity."
Id.
43 Id. at 1168.
44Id.
45 See id.
46 862 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1988).
47 See id. at 683. Judge Doty determined that Congress intended for prospective
relief to be awarded, but not retroactive relief. See id. at 687. Judge Fagg found that no
relief whatsoever can be awarded under the Act. See id. at 683. Chief Judge Lay held
that there could be an award of compensatory relief against a state agency: "I would
hold both that the Act authorizes arbitration panels to assess compensatory damage
awards against state agencies and that Congress has abrogated sovereign immunity for
states which participate in the blind vendor program." Id. at 684.
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that the Act was authorized to award prospective damages.48 One judge
held that the awarding of compensatory damages was authorized against a
state. 49 Without a consistent and unified holding by the Eighth Circuit,
though, McNabb is arguably not a very persuasive authority in resolving
the issue at hand.
The Premo court also considered the Third Circuit's interpretation of
the Act in Delaware Department of Health and Social Services, Division for
the Visually Impaired v. United States Department of Education, et al.50
The Third Circuit held that a blind vendor was entitled to compensatory
damages awarded by an arbitration panel. 51 The Third Circuit based its
reasoning on the premise that Delaware had waived its sovereign immunity
because "after full notice of the Act's requirements, one of which was an
agreement to arbitration, it voluntarily made application with the Secretary
to participate in the Randolph-Sheppard program." 52 Additionally, the
court found that there was an absence of textual support that the Act was to
be "subject to the vagaries of state law." 53 Providing further support is that
at the time of the amendment to the Act, compensatory relief awarded by
arbitration panels was a common occurrence. If Congress wanted to change
the Act it could have; instead, a state's waiver of sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment is conditioned on participation in the program. 54
Delaware is important because the court determined that by voluntarily
participating in the Act, the state waives any Eleventh Amendment
protections, similar to Tennessee.
After the Premo court analyzed the aforementioned circuit cases
addressing the Eleventh Amendment's effect on the Act, the court elected
to follow the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Tennessee, holding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to arbitration proceedings under the Act. 55 The
48 See id. at 683-684. Chief Judge Lay and Judge Doty were the two judges that
found that "the arbitration panel is authorized to award prospective damages... ." Id.
49 See id. at 684; see also supra note 47.
50 772 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1985).
51 See id. at 1136-1138.
52 Id. at 1138. The court further noted that "[t]he waiver of sovereign immunity
with respect to arbitration could hardly have been made more clearly." Id. For a
further analysis by the Third Circuit as to the legislative history and statutory
interpretation of the Act, see id. at 1125-1134.
53 Id. at 1137.
54 See id. at 1137-1138.
55 See Premo v. Martin, 119 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1997); see also supra notes
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Premo court, in determining whether the arbitration panel had the authority
to award compensatory relief on the text of the Amendment, found that
because the Eleventh Amendment refers "to the 'Judicial power of the
United States,' the Amendment on its face limits only the authority of
Article III courts." 56 Additionally, the court looked to the text of the Act,
which provides for arbitration hearings for dissatisfied vendors. 57 The Act
further declares that the results of such arbitration proceedings "shall be
final and binding on the parties." 58 Therefore, the Premo court, following
traditional statutory construction and the decisions in Tennessee and
Delaware, held that compensatory awards by arbitration panels are not
precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. 59
Once the Premo court determined that arbitration panels have the
authority to award compensatory relief, it proceeded to resolve whether
such an award is enforceable in federal court. 60 Because waiver is a
recognized exception to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the
court analyzed the doctrine of waiver and whether the State had renounced
its sovereign immunity. 61 The test for determining whether a state has
waived its sovereign immunity is if: "(1) the state expressly consents to
suit; (2) a state statute or constitution so provides; or (3) Congress clearly
intended to condition the state's participation in a program or activity on the
state's waiver of immunity." 62
From the facts of the case, the court determined that the first two
elements of the test were inapplicable to the case at bar. However, in
investigating the third element, the court found "overwhelming" evidence
38-45 and accompanying text.
56 PreMo, 119 F.3d at 769 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). See also supra note 23.
57 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. If a vendor's grievance is not settled
by a hearing, the states must "agree to submit the grievances of any blind licensee not
otherwise resolved by such hearing to arbitration as provided in section 107d-1 .... "
Premo, 119 F.3d at 769 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 10T(6)).
58 20 U.S.C. § 107d-l(a).
59 See Premo, 119 F.3d at 769-770.
60 See id. at 770-771.
61 See id; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62 Premo, 119 F.3d at 770 (citing Micomonaco v. Washington, 45 F.3d 316, 319
(9th Cir. 1995)). California's counterpart statute to the Act provides that an arbitration
decision "shall be final and binding on the parties except as otherwise provided in this
act." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 19635 (West 1991).
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that state participation in the Act was grounded "on consent to federal
judicial enforcement of compensatory awards . .. .63 The State
participated in the Act voluntarily, subject to the condition of arbitration as
set forth in the Act.64 Additionally, the text of the Act states that the
decision by the panel "shall be subject to appeal and review as a final
agency action for purposes of chapter 7 of [the APA] . . 65 From a
statutory analysis of the Act and its intersection with the APA, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the State had clearly consented to the conditions of
the Act, thereby waiving any immunity claims under the Eleventh
Amendment.
The Premo court also analyzed the State's due process claims, finding
that the procedural decisions of the panel during the arbitration process
complied with the provisions of the Act and the APA; therefore, the State's
claims were meritless. 66 The court held that "[b]ecause the State is not a
'person' for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, the State's reliance on
the Due Process Clause was misplaced." 67 For the purposes of analyzing
the impact of Premo, however, the due process claims are a minor aspect of
the significance of the case.68
IV. CONCLUSION
The Premo court is the fourth circuit court to have examined the issue
of whether an award of compensatory relief by Randolph-Sheppard
arbitration panels is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The Sixth
63 Premo, 119 F.3d at 770. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. For an
explanation of participation in the Act, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
64 See Premo, 119 F.3d at 770.
65 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706). The APA, in pertinent part, allows "for
appeal and review under the APA .... [and] unequivocally guarantees that arbitration
awards will be judicially enforceable." Premo, 119 F.3d at 770 (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 703). See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
66 See Premo, 119 F.3d at 771-772.
67 1d. at 771 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-324
(1966)). The court noted that the State should have utilized the APA as the correct
standard for judicial review. See id. 'The court went on to find that Martin's panel
member choice complied with the Act, that the panel was correct in denying the State's
motion for continuance and that the testimony introduced by Martin's former attorney
was appropriate. See id. at 771-772.
68 See id.
775
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Circuit, in the Tennessee case, held that the Eleventh Amendment does not
prevent the awarding of damages by an arbitration panel. 69 The Eighth
Circuit, in the McNabb case, reached a split decision, reflecting a lack of
consensus, and providing little guidance in any analysis of the Eleventh
Amendment and its affect on the Act.70 The Third Circuit, in the Delaware
case, held that a blind vendor is entitled to compensatory damages
irrespective of the Eleventh Amendment, because the State had waived its
sovereign immunity. 71 With an obvious split in the circuits, and the absence
of controlling authority from the Supreme Court, a definitive answer to this
issue remains unavailable.
However, the Premo court's decision, holding that compensatory
awards against a state are not prevented by the Eleventh Amendment, is a
correct decision. First, upon examination, the direction of jurisprudence
seems to be heading toward the awarding of compensatory relief by
arbitration panels. By following Tennessee and Delaware, in which the
courts found that the Eleventh Amendment protections were waived when
states applied to partake in the Act, the Premo court followed a sound and
logical precedent. Second, the very words of the Act state that an
arbitration decision "shall be final and binding on the parties" in an action
under the Act.72 The plain meaning of the Act mandates that arbitration
decisions are binding, and that would include awards of compensatory
relief. Finally, as a policy matter, a party should be entitled to
compensation for injuries sustained. When the State has willingly agreed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the Act, including arbitration, a
party who is a victim of a wrongful state action within the parameters of the
Act deserves to be restored by compensatory awards. These three factors
support the Premo court's correct analysis of the issue.
Although there is a current lack of unanimity among the circuits
concerning whether such awards against a state can overcome a state's
immunity, notably the Eighth Circuit's failure to conclusively resolve the
issue, 73 the Premo court followed a very logical, textual approach in its
interpretation of the Act and the Eleventh Amendment. However, absent
69 See id.
70 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
72 20 U.S.C. § 107d-l(a).
73 See supra notes 46-48.
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any decision from the Supreme Court, for the near future these issues will
have to be resolved case-by-case, circuit-by-circuit.
Nina M. Person
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